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Abstract 
The Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project is one of the four projects within the 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) Aviation Safety Program (AvSafe). The 
IVHM Project conducts research to develop validated tools and technologies for automated detection, 
diagnosis, and prognosis that enable mitigation of adverse events during flight. Adverse events include 
those that arise from system, subsystem, or component failure, faults, and malfunctions due to damage, 
degradation, or environmental hazards that occur during flight. Determining the causal factors and 
adverse events related to IVHM technologies will help in the formulation of research requirements and 
establish a list of example adverse conditions against which IVHM technologies can be evaluated. This 
paper documents the results of an examination of the most recent statistical/prognostic accident and 
incident data that is available from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) 
System to determine the causal factors of system/component failures and/or malfunctions in U.S. 
commercial aviation accidents and incidents. 
Nomenclature 
AIDS  Accident/Incident Data System 
AvSafe  Aviation Safety Program 
ASIAS  Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing  
ASRS  Aviation Safety Reporting System 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FMC  Flight Management Computer 
FMS  Flight Management System 
GPWS  Ground Proximity Warning System 
NTSB  National Transportation Safety Board 
ILS  Instrument Landing System 
ILS  Inertial Navigation System 
IVHM  Integrated Vehicle Health Management 
NASA  National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
JPDO  Joint Planning and Development Office 
SCFM  System/Component Failure/Malfunction 
TCAS  Traffic Collision Avoidance System 
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TM  Technical Memorandum 
VHF  Very High Frequency 
VOR  VHF Omni-directional Radio 
Introduction 
The need for integrated vehicle health management research for the purpose of improving aviation 
safety has been affirmed by leaders in the aviation community. The “Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics: 
Foundation for the Future”, (Ref. 1) cites integrated vehicle health management as being one of a group of 
the highest research and technology challenges for NASA aeronautics. The Joint Planning and Development 
Office’s “National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan” which defines national goals, objectives, and strategies 
for aviation safety improvements cites the improvement of vehicle systems health management as one of its 
recommended research strategies. (Ref. 2) The National Institute of Aerospace’s “Aviation Plan for 
American Leadership” report (Ref. 3) which identifies research and technology challenges for improving 
aviation safety recommends research in vehicle “health reliability and management”. Because of this well 
documented need for IVHM research, NASA initiated the IVHM Project. 
NASA’s IVHM Project conducts research to develop validated tools and technologies for automated 
detection, diagnosis, and prognosis that enable mitigation of adverse events during flight. (Ref. 4) 
Adverse events include those that arise from system, subsystem, or component failures, faults, and 
malfunctions due to damage, degradation, or environmental hazards that occur during flight. Determining 
the causal factors and adverse events that drive the need for IVHM technologies will assist in the 
formulation of research requirements. With limited funding available for IVHM research, it is important 
to identify those research areas that will have the most impact in addressing IVHM related causal factors 
and adverse events. The purpose of this study was to review statistical data to interpret and extract 
information about causal factors in aircraft incidents and accidents which are related to key research areas 
in the IVHM Project. 
Technical Approach 
Two separate analyses are presented in this paper. The first analysis examines the publicly available 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) accident and 
incident data. The second analysis is an examination of the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) 
incident reports. All of these data sources can be accessed using the Aviation Safety Information Analysis 
and Sharing (ASIAS) System. (Ref. 5) The focus of both analyses was the determination of the causal 
factors of incidents and accidents associated with failures and/or malfunctions associated with the various 
systems and/or components of commercial aircraft. 
In these analyses, “commercial” is defined per the FAA’s Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) 121, 
Scheduled Part 135, and Non-Scheduled Part 135 flight operations (Ref. 6). Part 121 operations applies to 
major airlines and cargo carriers that fly large transport-category aircraft while part 135 applies to 
commercial aircraft air carriers commonly referred to as commuter airlines. Prior to March 1997, Part 121 
operations included aircraft with 30 or more seats. In March 1997, the definition of Part 121 operations 
changed and now includes those aircraft with ten or more seats. Scheduled operation refers to “any 
common carriage passenger-carrying operation for compensation or hire conducted by an air carrier or 
commercial operator for which the certificate holder or its representative offers in advance the departure 
location, departure time, and arrival location. A non-scheduled operation refers to “any operation for 
compensation or hire in which the departure time, departure location, and arrival location are specifically 
negotiated with the customer”.  
Non-impact fires were included as a type of malfunction, even when the cause of the fire was not 
specified. 
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The safety risk is based on both accidents and incidents. Accidents and incidents have been defined 
per the NTSB definition as follows: (Ref. 7) 
 
Accident—An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft, which takes place between the time 
any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such persons have disembarked, and in 
which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in which the aircraft receives substantial damage.  
Incident—An occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which 
affects or could affect the safety of operations. 
NTSB and FAA Accident/Incident Data Analyses 
These analyses looked at the safety risk associated with failures or malfunctions of various systems or 
components of commercial aircraft during the period 1988 to 2003. The source for accident data was the 
NTSB Aviation Accident and Incident Data System, while the source for incident data was the FAA’s 
Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS). Although both databases contain accident and incident data, the 
FAA has primary investigative responsibility for incidents and the NTSB is the authority for accident 
investigation. The NTSB database contains information collected during an NTSB investigation of an 
accident or incident involving civil aircraft within the United States, its territories and possessions, and in 
international waters. AIDS contains data records for general aviation and commercial air carrier incidents 
since 1978. The information contained in AIDS is gathered from several sources including incident 
reports on FAA Form 8020-5. Data for total flight hours per year were obtained from tables published by 
the NTSB, which are based on data from the FAA. The abbreviation SCFM will be used throughout this 
paper to mean System/Component Failure/Malfunctions. 
 
TABLE 1.—SUMMARY OF SCFM EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Type of events Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 135 
combined 
Total flight hours 232,868,640 25,050,928 46,350,000 304,269,568 
Total accidents 600 213 1070 1883 
Accidents with SCFM 109 (18%) 33 (16%) 228 (21%) 370 (20%) 
SCFM accidents 
per million flight hours 
0.47 1.32 4.92 1.22 
Fatal accidents 60 (10%) 49 (23%) 278 (26%) 387 (21%) 
Fatal accidents with 
SCFM 
16 (27%) 5 (10%) 47 (17%) 68 (18%) 
Total fatalities 2151 328 664 3143 
Fatalities in accidents with 
SCFM 
777 (36%) 52 (16%) 109 (16%) 938 (30%) 
Total incidents 7497 2218 2081 11,796 
Incidents with SCFM 4957 (66%) 1557 (70%) 1218 (58%) 7,732 (66%) 
SCFM incidents 
per million flight hours 
21.29 62.15 26.28 25.4 
 
A summary of the SCFM events can be found in Table 1. For the three operational categories 
examined, between 16 percent and 21 percent of commercial accidents during the 1988-2003 period 
involved a SCFM. Scheduled Part 135 accidents had the lowest proportion of accidents (16 percent), fatal 
accidents (10 percent) and total fatalities (328) associated with SCFM. In Part 121 flights, 18 percent of 
the accidents, 27 percent of the fatal accidents and 36 percent of fatalities were associated with SCFM. In 
Non-Scheduled Part 135 flights, 21 percent of the accidents, 17 percent of the fatal accidents and 
16 percent of the fatalities were associated with SCFM. There is at least one fatality in 18 percent of all 
SCFM accidents. 
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Between 58 and 70 percent of all incidents were caused by SCFM of system or component. Despite 
having the lowest percentage of SCFM accidents among the three flight operation categories, Scheduled 
Part 135 flights had the highest percentage of SCFM incidents. Non-Scheduled Part 135 flights had the 
highest percentage of accidents and the lowest percentage of incidents related to SCFM. 
In Part 121 flights, 21 SCFM occurred for each one million flight hours; the rate was even higher 
among part 135 flights. 
For each accident and incident, the system affected by the SCFM was determined (Tables 2 and 3). In 
some events multiple systems were affected, and in these cases the first system affected was selected. For 
example, if an electrical malfunction preceded an engine fire, that event was categorized under Electrical. 
A large percentage of accidents with SCFM occurred due to failures or malfunctions in the engine system 
(33 to 49 percent) and landing gear system (21 to 30 percent). A large percentage of incidents with SCFM 
occur due to failures in the engine system (28 to 31 percent) and landing gear system (20 to 46 percent).  
 
TABLE 2.—ACCIDENTS WITH A SYSTEM AFFECTED BY SCFM BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
System Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Non-scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 135 
combined 
     
Total accidents 109 33 228 370 
Engine 36 (33%) 12 (36%) 111 (49%) 159 (43%) 
Landing gear 23 (21%) 10 (30%) 64 (28%) 97 (26%) 
Flight control 10 (9%) 3 (9%) 9 (4%) 22 (6%) 
Electrical 8 (7%) 1 (3%) 12 (5%) 21 (6%) 
Fuel 4 (4%) 3 (9%) 13 (6%) 20 (5%) 
Hydraulic 9 (8%) 2 (6%) 7 (3%) 18 (5%) 
Structure 5 (5%) 1 (3%) 7 (3%) 13 (4%) 
Other 8 (7%) 1 (3%) 4 (2%) 13 (4%) 
Instrumentation/ 
communication/ 
navigation 
5 (5%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 5 (1%) 
Unknown 1 (1%) 0 (0%) 1 (0%) 2 (0%) 
 
TABLE 3.—INCIDENTS WITH A SYSTEM AFFECTED BY SCFM BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
System Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Non-scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 135 
combined 
     
Total incidents 4957 1557 1218 7732 
Engine 1384 (28%) 486 (31%) 349 (29%) 2219 (29%) 
Landing gear 990 (20%) 509 (33%) 558 (46%) 2057 (27%) 
Other 615 (12%) 135 (9%) 47 (4%) 797 (10%) 
Hydraulic 414 (8%) 57 (4%) 45 (4%) 516 (7%) 
Flight control 431 (9%) 43 (3%) 28 (2%) 502 (6%) 
Fuel 215 (4%) 80 (5%) 54 (4%) 349 (4%) 
Structure 214 (4%) 80 (5%) 49 (4.0%) 343 (4%) 
Comfort systems 246 (5%) 54 (4%) 20 (2%) 320 (4%) 
Electrical 191 (4%) 64 (4%) 47 (4%) 302 (4%) 
Pressurization 174 (4%) 15 (1%) 8 (1%) 197 (2%) 
Instrumentation/ 
communication/ 
navigation 
83 (2%) 34 (2%) 13 (1%) 130 (2%) 
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The NTSB database includes causal factors for each accident. The SCFM accidents presented in 
Table 2 were further grouped into four system sub-categories: engine or fuel, flight control or structural, 
landing gear or hydraulic, and other. The most frequent causal factors of the SCFM accidents that are 
linked to these four system sub-categories are presented in Tables 4 though 6. The entire list of causal 
factors is too extensive for presentation in this paper. Some of the causal factors specify the problem with 
the component (corroded, fractured, separated, etc.) and others address errors by individuals (maintenance 
personnel) or groups of people (manufacturer, the company or operator) or regulatory deficiencies (the 
FAA). Most events have more than one causal factor. Each table includes the number of accidents within 
the particular group of systems; the percentages given are based on the number of accidents, not on the 
number of causal factors. The entire listing of causes and failures can be found in the NASA Technical 
Memorandum (TM): Causal Factors and Adverse Events of Aviation Accidents and Incidents Related to 
Integrated Vehicle Health Management (Ref. 8). 
Of all the engine or fuel SCFM (Table 4) in commercial aircraft, 38 percent were related to 
maintenance errors. Some part of the engine or fuel system was said to have failed in 35 percent of the 
accidents and fatigue was noted in 23 percent of the accidents. 
Maintenance errors were involved in 46 percent of flight control or structural SCFM in commercial 
aircraft accidents (Table 5). Component failure was cited in 29 percent of the accidents. In 23 percent of 
the accidents a component separated. 
 
TABLE 4.—THE MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF ENGINE OR FUEL SCFM 
ACCIDENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Cause of failure/malfunction 
Operation category  
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 
135 combined 
  
Total engine or fuel SCFM 
accidents 40 15 124 179 
Maintenance related 17 (42%) 3 (20%) 49 (40%) 69 (38%) 
Component failure 18 (45%) 5 (33%) 39 (31%) 62 (35%) 
Component fatigue 8 (20%) 3 (20%) 30 (24%) 41 (23%) 
Component separated 6 (15%) 3 (20%) 16 (13%) 25 (14%) 
Component fractured 3 (8%) 1 (7%) 16 (13%) 20 (11%) 
Manufacturing/Design 9 (22%) 3 (20%) 8 (6%) 20 (11%) 
Component disconnected 3 (6%) 1 (7%) 15 (12%) 19 (11%) 
Oil deprivation 1 (2%) 1 (7%) 13 (10%) 15 (8%) 
 
TABLE 5.—THE MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF FLIGHT CONTROL OR STRUCTURAL SCFM 
EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Cause of failure/malfunction 
Operation category  
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 
135 combined 
  
Total flight control or 
structural SCFM accidents 15 4 16 35 
Maintenance related 8 (53%) 2 (50%) 6 (38%) 16 (46%) 
Component failure 3 (20%) 2 (50%) 5 (31%) 10 (29%) 
Component separated 4 (27%) 1 (25%) 3 (19%) 8 (23%) 
Manufacturing/Design 6 (40%) 0 (0%) 1 (6%) 7 (20%) 
Component jammed 2 (13%) 1 (25%) 4 (25%) 7 (20%) 
Component inoperative 2 (13%) 0 (0%) 3 (19%) 5 (14%) 
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Maintenance errors were involved in 28 percent of landing gear or hydraulic system SCFM 
commercial accidents (Table 6). A component was said to have failed in 48 percent of the accidents. A 
component showed fatigue in 18 percent of the accidents and there was a loss of hydraulic fluid in 
15 percent of the accidents.  
Table 7 shows the most frequent causes of SCFM accidents in the other category. Maintenance errors 
were cited in 32 percent of the accidents, electrical failure was involved in 17 percent of the accidents and 
15 percent of the accidents cited wire chafing and arcing as a cause.  
Of interest is that the most frequent causal factors cited were maintenance errors in 35 percent of the 
SCFM accidents, (Table 8), followed by component failure in 34 percent of the accidents, and component 
fatigue in 17 percent of accidents. 
 
TABLE 6.—THE MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF LANDING GEAR OR HYDRAULIC SCFM 
EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Cause of failure/Malfunction 
Operation category  
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 
Non-
Scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 
135 Combined 
     
Total landing gear or Hydraulic 
System SCFM accidents 32 12 71 115 
Component failure 18 (56%) 3 (25%) 34 (48%) 55 (48%) 
Maintenance related 8 (25%) 4 (33%) 20 (28%) 32 (28%) 
Component fatigue 7 (22%) 2 (17%) 12 (17%) 21 (18%) 
Hydraulic fluid loss 8 (25%) 3 (25%) 6 (8%) 17 (15%) 
 
TABLE 7.—THE MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF OTHER* SCFM EVENTS BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Cause of failure/Malfunction 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 
135 Combined 
     
Total other* SCFM accidents 22 2 17 41 
Maintenance related 9 (41%) 1 (50%) 3 (18%) 13 (32%) 
Electrical failure 1 (4%) 0 (0%) 6 (35%) 7 (17%) 
Wiring chafed/arcing 3 (14%) 1 (50%) 2 (12%) 6 (15%) 
*Other includes Electrical, Instrumentation/Communication/Navigation, Anti-ice/De-ice system, APU, Cargo 
Fire, Galley, Heating, Oxygen, Pressurization, Warning Systems, Vacuum Pump and Unknown 
 
TABLE 8.—THE MOST FREQUENT CAUSES OF SCFM BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Cause of failure/Malfunction 
Operation category 
Part 121 Scheduled Part 135 
Non-Scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 
135 combined 
     
Total SCFM accidents  109 (29%) 33 (9%) 228 (62%) 370 
Maintenance related 42 (32%) 10 (8%) 78 (60%) 130 (35%) 
Component failure 39 (31%) 10 (8%) 78 (61%) 127 (34%) 
Component fatigue 15 (24%) 5 (8%) 42 (68%) 62 (17%) 
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Further analysis of SCFM accidents compared the severity in the four system categories. Two types 
of severity were analyzed: fatalities and aircraft damage. Table 9 compares the four system groups’ fatal 
accidents and fatality rates. Table 10 compares the four system groups’ aircraft damage sustained as a 
result of the accident. Although the Landing Gear or Hydraulic System category has 115 total accidents, 
only one was a fatal accident with five fatalities. In contrast, the Engine or Fuel System category has 179 
total accidents of which 44 were fatal accidents (25 percent) with 276 fatalities. The Flight Control or 
Structure Systems category has 35 accidents, yet twelve were fatal accidents (34 percent) with 297 
fatalities. Accidents involving SCFM of the Engine or Fuel System or the Flight Control or Structure 
Systems were more likely to result in destroyed aircraft (27 and 29 percent) than the Landing Gear or 
Hydraulics System Group Category (1 percent). Even though Flight Control or Structure SCFM accidents 
were less frequent than Landing Gear or Hydraulic System SCFM, the outcomes were far worse.  
The consequence of the SCFM in each of the four system groups is shown in Table 11. In Part 121 
and Scheduled Part 135 accidents, the flight control or structural SCFM were the most likely group to 
result in in-flight loss of control. Landing gear or hydraulic SCFM were the most likely type to occur with 
the aircraft on the ground, regardless of operation category. With an engine or fuel system SCFM, Part 
121 flights were most likely to make an uneventful landing, while Part 135 flights were most likely to 
make a complicated landing. 
 
 
TABLE 9.—ACCIDENT FATALITY CHARACTERISTICS BY SCFM SYSTEM GROUP AND 
BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
System group Fatality 
characteristics 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Non-
Scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 
135 combined 
Engine or fuel system Total accidents 40 15 124 179 
 Fatal accidents 4 (10%) 3 (20%) 37 (30%) 44 (25%) 
 Total fatalities 151 33 92 276 
Flight control or structure Total accidents 15 4 16 35 
 Fatal accidents 7 (47%) 1 (25%) 4 (25%) 12 (34%) 
 Total fatalities 279 14 4 297 
Landing gear or Hydraulic Total accidents 32 12 71 115 
 Fatal accidents 0 (0%) 1 (8%) 0 (0%) 1 (1%) 
 Total fatalities 0 5 0 5 
Instrument/Communication/ 
Navigation, Electrical, Other, 
Unknown 
Total accidents 22 2 17 41 
 Fatal accidents 5 (23%) 0 (0%) 6 (35%) 11 (27%) 
 Total fatalities 347 0  13 360 
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TABLE 10.—ACCIDENT AIRCRAFT DAMAGE SEVERITY BY SCFM SYSTEM GROUP 
AND BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
System group Aircraft damage Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Non-scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 
135 combined 
Engine or fuel system Total accidents 40 15 124 179 
 Destroyed 5 (12.5%) 3 (20.0%) 41 (33.1%) 49 (27%) 
 Substantial damage 29 (72.5%) 11 (73.3%) 83 (66.9%) 123 (69%) 
 Minor damage 1 (2.5%) 1 (6.7%) 0 2 (1%) 
 No damage 5 (12.5%) 0 0 5 (3%) 
Flight control or structure Total accidents 15 4 16 35 
 Destroyed 5 (33.3%) 1 (25.0%) 4 (25.0%) 10 (29%) 
 Substantial damage 10 (67.7%) 2 (50.0%) 12 (75.0%) 24 (68%) 
 Minor damage 0 1 (25.0%) 0 1 (3%) 
 No damage 0 0 0 0 (0%) 
Landing gear or hydraulics Total accidents 32 12 71 115 
 Destroyed 0 1 (8.3%) 0 1 (1%) 
 Substantial damage 25 (78.1%) 11 (91.7%) 71 (100%) 107 (93%) 
 Minor damage 4 (12.5%) 0 0 4 (3%) 
 No damage 3 (9.4%) 0 0 3 (3%) 
Electrical, instrumentation, 
communication, navigation, 
other, unknown 
Total accidents 22 2 17 41 
 Destroyed 7 (31.8%) 0 6 (35.3%) 13 (32%) 
 Substantial damage 4 (18.2%) 2 (100%) 11 (64.7%) 17 (41%) 
 Minor damage 4 (18.2%) 0 0 4 (10%) 
 No damage 7 (31.8%) 0 0 7 (17%) 
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TABLE 11.—CONSEQUENCE OF SCFM BY SYSTEM GROUP AND BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
System group Consequence of 
event 
Operation 
Part 121 Scheduled 
Part 135 
Non-scheduled 
Part 135 
Part 121 and 135 
combined 
Engine or fuel system Total accidents 40 15 124 179 
 On ground at 
time of event 
11 (28%) 2 (13%) 4 (3%) 17 (9%) 
 Uneventful landing 18 (45%) 1 (7%) 7 (6%) 26 (14%) 
 In-flight loss 
of control 
3 (8%) 2 (13%) 17 (14%) 22 (12%) 
 Complicated landing 8 (20%) 10 (67%) 96 (77%) 114 (64%) 
Flight control or 
structure 
Total accidents 15 4 16 35 
 On ground at time of 
event 
1 (7%) 0 1 (6%) 2 (6%) 
 Uneventful landing 5 (33%) 2 (50%) 3 (19%) 10 (29%) 
 In-flight loss of 
control 
5 (33%) 1 (25%) 3 (19%) 9 (26%) 
 Complicated landing 4 (27%) 1 (25%) 9 (56%) 14 (40%) 
Landing gear or 
hydraulics 
Total accidents 32 12 71 115 
 On ground at 
time of event 
20 (62%) 4 (33%) 21 (30%) 45 (39%) 
 Uneventful landing 0 1 (8%) 0 1 (1%) 
 In-flight loss 
of control 
1 (3%) 1 (8%) 0 2 (2%) 
 Complicated landing 11 (34%) 6 (50%) 50 (70%) 67 (58%) 
Electrical, 
instrumentation, 
communication, 
navigation, other, 
unknown 
Total accidents 22 2 17 41 
 On ground at time of 
event 
7 (32%) 0 1 (6%) 8 (20%) 
 Uneventful landing 9 (41%) 0 3 (18%) 12 (29%) 
 In-flight loss of 
control 
4 (18%) 0 6 (35%) 10 (24%) 
 Complicated landing 2 (9%) 2 (100%) 7 (41%) 11 (27%) 
Aviation Safety Reporting System Incident Analysis 
The Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is a voluntary, non-punitive, self reporting system 
administered by NASA Ames Research Center that includes incident reports submitted by members of the 
flight crew and other people working in the aviation industry. The ASRS reports do not represent an 
unbiased sample of aviation incidents, and the results presented here should not be considered statistically 
representative, but rather informational in nature. Data used in this analysis are for the period January 
1993 through March 2008. While the ASRS online database includes incidents starting in 1988, 
information on the FAR Part Flight Operations is available only beginning in 1993. Since other flight 
operations, such as Part 91 (general aviation), may  provide substantially different data compared with 
Parts 121 and 135, it was decided to use only those years for which the FAR Part Flight Operations are 
known. During this time period there were 60,380 incident reports for Part 121 operation and 6,151 
incident reports for Part 135 operations resulting in a total of 66,531 reports for commercial aircraft. Each 
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ASRS incident report lists the primary problem (or cause), and, if applicable, the component involved. 
While this categorization is performed by the experts at ASRS, the analysis presented in this paper further 
categorized those components into groups based on aircraft subsystems. 
ASRS identifies the most significant factor of the incident and includes it under the category “Primary 
Problem.” Of the 13,390 incident reports listed as having “Aircraft” as the primary problem or cause, 
12,395 can be attributed to “Equipment Problems” as shown in Table 12. During some incidents, multiple 
components failed in succession. Separately and combined, equipment problems account for 
approximately 93 percent of incidents whose primary factor was “Aircraft” for both FAR Parts 121 and 
135. Subcategories from within this primary problem are presented in Table 13. 
To provide an alternative approach to research, the SCFMs were further grouped by aircraft system. 
Then the components were ranked in order of frequency within the new subcategories. It must be noted 
than some incidents had more than one type of aircraft system failure, therefore the total of the Aircraft 
System SCFMs is actually greater than the Equipment Problem total shown in Table 12. Shown in 
Table 13, the top four systems cause 65 percent of all aircraft equipment failures during incidents. Those 
systems are Avionics, Propulsions Systems, Landing Gear, and Environmental Controls System. The top 
eight systems cause 88 percent of all aircraft SCFM during incidents. The top eight systems are expanded 
to include Control Surfaces, Structures, Electrical Systems, and the Hydraulic System. 
 
TABLE 12.—SYSTEM AFFECTED BY SCFM BY OPERATION CATEGORY 
Subcategory Incident frequency of operation 
Part 121 Part 135 Part 121 and 135 combined 
Equipment problem 11268 1127 12395 
Non-adherence 164 31 195 
Airspace violation 5 0 5 
Altitude deviation 203 11 214 
Cabin event 44 1 45 
Conflict 77 10 87 
Excursion 2 1 3 
Ground encounter 4 0 4 
Incursion 2 1 3 
Inflight encounter 62 9 71 
Maintenance problem 15 0 15 
Other anomaly 325 20 345 
Other spatial deviation 8 0 8 
Total 12179 1211 13390 
 
TABLE 13.—FREQUENCIES OF SCFM GROUPED BY SYSTEM 
Aircraft system Frequency of failure/ 
malfunction 
Avionics 3208 
Propulsion system 2424 
Landing gear 1378 
Environmental control system 1247 
Control surfaces 996 
Electrical 669 
Hydraulics 657 
Structures 605 
Fuel System 278 
F & E- furnishings and 
equipment 
263 
Oil system 246 
Brakes 196 
Anti-Icing 110 
Miscellaneous 438 
Total 12715 
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Avionics 
While hardware features have extensive background research and testing of failures, avionics failures 
may be harder to predict and test. Information given by United Airlines in reference to Boeing 777 
aircraft indicates that health monitoring significantly reduces mechanical problems, but increases software 
problems (Ref. 9). More research is needed to insure that mechanical problems are not replaced by 
software problems. Because of the extremely high frequency of failures for avionics, along with the 
complexity of the system, further subcategories were developed for this study.  
Avionics failures were sorted into the subcategories in Table 14 and the distribution of failures is 
illuminating. While some subcategories, like Weather Systems, are negligibly small, others are very 
significant. Monitoring mainly includes indicators of health of individual systems such as landing gear or 
engine temperature, and it is nearly twice as large as any other subcategory. Included in Table 15 are the 
most frequent specific component failures of the avionics system. These failures account for 62 percent of 
all avionics failures. 
 
TABLE 14.—FREQUENCY OF SCFM 
FOR AVIONICS SUBCATEGORY 
Avionics 
subcategories 
Frequency of 
SCFM 
Monitoring 1174 
Navigation system 561 
Air flight control 451 
Communications 344 
Aircraft 
management 
337 
Collision 
avoidance system 
309 
Weather systems 32 
Total 3208 
 
TABLE 15.—FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC AVIONICS COMPONENT SCFM 
Component Subcategory Frequency of SCFM 
FMS/FMC Navigation 267 
Autopilot Air flight control 241 
Indicating and warning - landing gear Monitoring 142 
GPWS Collision avoidance systems 120 
VHF Communications 103 
Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) Collision avoidance systems 96 
Fire/Overheat warning Aircraft management 95 
ILS/VOR Navigation 94 
Cargo compartment fire/Overheat warning Monitoring 86 
Door warning system Aircraft management 83 
Fuel quantity-pressure indication Monitoring 81 
Transponder Communications 79 
Power plant fire/Overheat warning Monitoring 77 
Auto throttle/Speed control Monitoring 72 
Air/Ground communication Communications 68 
Oil pressure indication Monitoring 65 
Air data computer Aircraft management 57 
TCAS equipment Collision avoidance systems 55 
INS (Inertial navigation system) Air flight control 54 
Altimeter Monitoring 52 
Total  1987 
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Propulsion Systems 
The propulsion systems category was also large and complex, so subcategories were developed to ease 
the analysis of its SCFMs. The Unspecified Engine subcategory contains the “turbine engine” and “engine” 
components illustrating the lack of uniformity of information detail provided in the ASRS incident reports. 
Some reports contain a great deal of detail, while others are very nonspecific. Many of the SCFMs of the 
propulsion system stated no more detail than “engine failure.” Table 16 shows the frequency of the 
propulsion sub-category SCFMs. Included in Table 17 are the most frequent specific component failures of 
the Propulsion System. These failures account for 60 percent of all Propulsion System failures. The two 
components with the greatest number of failures are the “Engine” and “Turbine Engine” components, which 
are fairly vague categories. The rest of the propulsion failures were actually remarkably specific and diverse, 
so unlike avionics, individual components did not have high rates of failure. Without “engine” and “turbine 
engine,” most of the propulsion components do not fail a significant amount of times. Specific engine 
components failures are not always clearly reported in ASRS. 
Landing Gear 
The landing gear system also contributed to a significant number of failures. Its component problems 
were less varied than those of avionics or propulsion. The most problematic component was the gear-
extend/retract mechanism followed by the main gear tires. There were several other important 
components that bear further consideration in Table 18. These failures account for 75 percent of all 
landing gear failures. 
 
TABLE 16.—FREQUENCY OF SCFM FOR 
PROPULSION SYSTEMS SUBCATEGORY 
Propulsion subcategory Frequency of 
failure/ 
malfunction 
Unspecified engine 1011 
Power plant 376 
Auxiliary systems 329 
Propeller engine system 199 
Compressor 135 
Turbine 129 
Exhaust/Nozzle 86 
Nacelle/Cowling 67 
Turbofan system 57 
Engine starting 33 
Combustor 2 
Total 2424 
 
TABLE 17.—FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC PROPULSION SYSTEM SCFM 
Component Subcategory Frequency of failure/ 
malfunction 
Turbine engine Unspecified engine 752 
Engine Unspecified engine 259 
Power plant lubrication system Power plant 91 
Compressor Compressor 73 
Throttle/Power level Power plant 69 
Power plant fuel control Power plant 55 
Circuit breaker/Fuse/ 
Thermocouple 
Power plant 54 
Cowling Nacelle/Cowling 50 
Turbine assembly Turbine 48 
Total  1451 
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TABLE 18.—FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC LANDING GEAR SYSTEM SCFM 
Component Frequency of failure/malfunction 
Gear extend/Retract mechanism 174 
Main gear tire 165 
Nose gear 128 
Landing gear indicating system 98 
Antiskid system 90 
Nosewheel steering 90 
Leading edge slat 77 
Generator drive 76 
Main gear 68 
Main gear door 58 
Total 1024 
 
TABLE 19.—FREQUENCY OF SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS SCFM 
Component Frequency of failure/malfunction 
Pressurization system 351 
Air conditioning and pressurization 192 
Pressurization control system 162 
Air conditioning distribution system 130 
Aircraft cooling system 76 
AC generator/Alternator 71 
AC generation 68 
Total 1050 
Environmental Controls 
The environmental control system had the fourth highest impact on the incidents reported from 1993 
to 2008. Like the landing gear system, the environmental control system was less varied. A few 
components contributed to most of the total of 1247 SCFM. The pressurization system, air conditioning 
and pressurization components accounted for a large portion of the SCFM. The top failures in Table 19 
account for 84 percent of environmental controls failures. 
Results/Key Findings 
NSTB Accident/FAA Incident Data Analyses 
Between 1988 and 2003, twenty percent of all U.S. commercial aircraft accidents involved SCFM, 
and 18 percent of those accidents included at least one fatality. In addition, 66 percent of incidents during 
the same time period consisted of a SCFM. 
Of the 370 accidents affected by SCFM, 48 percent involved the engine or fuel systems, 31 percent 
involved the landing gear or hydraulic systems, 9 percent involve flight control or structural systems, and 
11 percent involved other aircraft systems. A total of 35 percent of all SCFM accidents had been caused 
by maintenance errors. The next most frequent causes of SCFM accidents in the research time period 
were component failure, 34 percent, and component fatigue, 17 percent. 
Aircraft destruction followed SCFM in twenty percent accidents. One possible contributing factor is 
that in-flight loss of control followed only about 12 percent of the SCFM. Among Part 121 accidents, 
65 percent of the SCFM either occurred while the aircraft was on the ground or resulted in an uneventful 
landing, whereas 69 percent of the Part 135 SCFM resulted in a complicated landing.  
In general, SCFM of either the landing gear or hydraulic systems result in less severe outcomes 
(fewer fatalities and less aircraft destruction) than other systems. This may be in part because these SCFM 
were the most likely type to occur while the aircraft was on the ground. Similarly, SCFM of either the 
structure or flight control systems result in more severe outcomes, perhaps because these were more likely 
to lead to in-flight loss of control. 
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ASRS Incident Data Analysis 
Of the 66,531 commercial incident reports contained in the ASRS system for the time period 1993 to 
March 2008, 20 percent or 13,390 incidents were grouped in the “Aircraft” Primary Problem category. 
During some incidents, multiple components failed in succession. Separately and combined, equipment 
problems (12, 395 incidents) accounted for approximately 93 percent of incidents whose primary factor 
was “Aircraft” for both FAR Parts 121 and 135. The most frequent systems cited in the equipment 
problems subcategory were: avionics (26 percent), propulsion systems (20 percent), landing gear 
(11 percent), and environmental control systems (10 percent). 
Of Avionics systems SCFM, the most common subsystem cited was the monitoring subcategory with 
1174 SCFM. Monitoring includes indicators of the health of individual systems and components such as 
the landing gear or engine temperature. Avionics and software failures are among the most frequent 
factors in incidents reported to ASRS, validating the importance of the performance, robustness, and 
reliability of software used in IVHM. Unfortunately, often the propulsion system SCFM were not clearly 
defined in the reports. The most frequently cited propulsion system component to have a SCFM was 
“turbine engine”.  
References 
1. Steering Committee for the Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics, National Research Council, 
Decadal Survey of Civil Aeronautics: Foundations for the Future, The National Academies Press, 
Washington D.C., 2006. 
2. The Joint Planning and Development Office, National Aviation Safety Strategic Plan, V8.0, 2008. 
3. The National Institute of Aerospace, Aviation Plan for American Leadership, 2006 Periodicals 
4. Srivastava, A., Mah, R., and Meyer, C., Integrated Vehicle Health Management Project Technical 
Plan, Version 2.02, National Aeronautics and Space Administration December 8, 2008. 
http://www.aeronautics.nasa.gov/nra_pdf/ivhm_tech_plan_c1.pdf.  Accessed July 20, 2009 
5. Federal Aviation Administration Aviation Safety Information Analysis Sharing (ASIAS) System, 
http://asias.faa.gov. Accessed September 28, 2008.  
6. National Transportation Safety Board. Annual Review of Aircraft Accident Data US Air Carrier 
Operations, Calendar Year 1999, NTSB/ARC-02/03, PB2002-109241, November 13, 2002, page 1. 
http://www.ntsb.gov/publictn/2002/arc0203.pdf. Accessed Aug 11, 2009 
7. National Transportation Safety Board. “Government Information Locator Service (GILS): Aviation 
Accident Synopses World Wide Web Page.” GILS: Aviation Accident Synopses, November 18, 2002. 
http://ntsb.gov/Info/gils/gilssyn.htm. Accessed July 30, 2009. 
8. Reveley, M.S., Briggs, J.L, Evans, J.K., Jones, S.M., Kurtoglu, T., Leone, K., Sandifer, C, “Causal 
Factors and Adverse Events of Aviation and Incidents Related to Integrated Health Management,” 
NASA TM submitted for publication, 2009. 
9. Zuniga, Fanny Allison, Douglas C. Maclise, Dennis J. Romano, Nicholas N. Jize, Philip F. Wysocki, 
and David P. Lawrence. “Integrated Systems Health Management for Exploration Systems.” AIAA, 
1st Space Exploration Conference: Continuing the Voyage of Discovery, 30 Jan. 2005, Orlando, 
Florida. American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics. AIAA. 12 Aug. 2008.   
<http://www.aiaa.org/content.cfm?pageid=406>able=paper&gid=30833>. 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188  
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the 
data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this 
burden, to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. 
Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB 
control number. 
PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 
1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 
01-06-2011 
2. REPORT TYPE 
Technical Memorandum 
3. DATES COVERED (From - To) 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
An Examination of Commercial Aviation Accidents and Incidents Related to Integrated 
Vehicle Health Management 
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER 
5b. GRANT NUMBER 
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 
6. AUTHOR(S) 
Reveley, Mary, S.; Briggs, Jeffrey, L.; Thomas, Megan, A.; Evans, Joni, K.; Jones, Sharon, 
M. 
5d. PROJECT NUMBER 
5e. TASK NUMBER 
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 
WBS 284848.02.01.03.40 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field 
Cleveland, Ohio 44135-3191 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
    REPORT NUMBER 
E-17688 
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Washington, DC 20546-0001 
10. SPONSORING/MONITOR'S
      ACRONYM(S) 
NASA 
11. SPONSORING/MONITORING
      REPORT NUMBER 
NASA/TM-2011-217023 
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Unclassified-Unlimited 
Subject Category: 01 
Available electronically at http://www.sti.nasa.gov 
This publication is available from the NASA Center for AeroSpace Information, 443-757-5802 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 
14. ABSTRACT 
The Integrated Vehicle Health Management (IVHM) Project is one of the four projects within the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration’s (NASA) Aviation Safety Program (AvSafe). The IVHM Project conducts research to develop validated tools and 
technologies for automated detection, diagnosis, and prognosis that enable mitigation of adverse events during flight. Adverse events 
include those that arise from system, subsystem, or component failure, faults, and malfunctions due to damage, degradation, or 
environmental hazards that occur during flight. Determining the causal factors and adverse events related to IVHM technologies will help in 
the formulation of research requirements and establish a list of example adverse conditions against which IVHM technologies can be 
evaluated. This paper documents the results of an examination of the most recent statistical/prognostic accident and incident data that is 
available from the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) System to determine the causal factors of system/component 
failures and/or malfunctions in U.S. commercial aviation accidents and incidents.
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Aircraft safety 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF
      ABSTRACT 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER
      OF 
      PAGES 
20 
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
STI Help Desk (email:help@sti.nasa.gov) 
a. REPORT 
U 
b. ABSTRACT 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
U 
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code) 
443-757-5802 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18


